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Abstract
We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed
by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather
than excluding inadmissible votes a priori), with respect to procedural control. In such con-
trol scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as
adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. SP-AV combines the voters’ preference
rankings with their approvals of candidates, where in elections with at least two candidates the
voters’ approval strategies are adjusted—if needed—to approve of their most-preferred candi-
date and to disapprove of their least-preferred candidate. This rule coerces admissibility of the
votes even in the presence of control actions, and hybridizes, in effect, approval with pluralitiy
voting.
We prove that this system is computationally resistant (i.e., the corresponding control prob-
lems are NP-hard) to 19 out of 22 types of constructive and destructive control. Thus, SP-AV
has more resistances to control than is currently known for any other natural voting system
with a polynomial-time winner problem. In particular, SP-AV is (after Copeland voting, see
Faliszewski et al. [2, 3]) the second natural voting system with an easy winner-determination
procedure that is known to have full resistance to constructive control, and unlike Copeland
voting it in addition displays broad resistance to destructive control.
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1 Introduction
Voting provides a particularly useful method for preference aggregation and collective decision-
making. While voting systems were originally used in political science, economics, and operations
research, they are now also of central importance in various areas of computer science, such as
artificial intelligence (in particular, within multiagent systems). In automated, large-scale computer
settings, voting systems have been applied, e.g., for planning [5] and similarity search [6], and have
also been used in the design of recommender systems [7] and ranking algorithms [8] (where they
help to lessen the spam in meta-search web-page rankings). For such applications, it is crucial to
explore the computational properties of voting systems and, in particular, to study the complexity
of problems related to voting (see, e.g., the survey by Faliszewski et al. [9]).
The study of voting systems from a complexity-theoretic perspective was initiated by Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick’s series of seminal papers about the complexity of winner determination [10],
manipulation [11], and procedural control [12] in elections. This paper contributes to the study
of electoral control, where an external agent—traditionally called the chair—seeks to influ-
ence the outcome of an election via procedural changes to the election’s structure, namely via
adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters (see Section 2.2 for the formal definitions of
our control problems). We consider both constructive control (introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [12]), where the chair’s goal is to make a given candidate the unique winner, and destructive
control (introduced by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [13]), where the chair’s goal is to
prevent a given candidate from being a unique winner.
We investigate the same twenty types of constructive and destructive control that were studied
for approval voting [13] and two additional control types introduced by Faliszewski et al. [14] (see
also [2]), and we do so for a variant of a voting system that was proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] as
a combination of preference-based and approval voting. Approval voting was introduced by Brams
and Fishburn [15] as follows: Every voter either approves or disapproves of each candidate, and
every candidate with the largest number of approvals is a winner. One of the simplest preference-
based voting systems is plurality: All voters report their preference rankings of the candidates,
and the winners are the candidates that are ranked first-place by the largest number of voters. The
purpose of this paper is to show that Brams and Sanver’s combined system (adapted here so as to
keep its useful features even in the presence of control actions) combines the strengths, in terms of
computational resistance to control, of plurality and approval voting.
Some voting systems are immune to certain types of control in the sense that it is never possible
for the chair to reach his or her goal via the corresponding control action. Immunity to any type of
control unconditionally shields the voting system against this particular control type. However, like
most voting systems approval voting is susceptible (i.e., not immune) to many types of control, and
plurality voting is susceptible to all types of control.1 However, and this was Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick’s brilliant insight [12], even for systems susceptible to control, the chair’s task of controlling
a given election may be too hard computationally (namely, NP-hard) for him or her to succeed. The
1A related line of research has shown that, in principle, all natural voting systems can be manipulated by strategic vot-
ers. Most notable among such results is the classical work of Gibbard [16] and Satterthwaite [17]. The study of strategy-
proofness is still an extremely active and interesting area in social choice theory (see, e.g., Duggan and Schwartz [18])
and in artificial intelligence (see, e.g., Everaere et al. [19]).
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Number of Condorcet Approval Llull Copeland Plurality SP-AV
resistances 3 4 14 15 16 19
immunities 4 9 0 0 0 0
vulnerabilities 7 9 8 7 6 3
References [12, 13] [12, 13] [2, 14, 3] [2, 14, 3] [12, 13, 2, 14] Theorem 3.1
Table 1: Number of resistances, immunities, and vulnerabilities to our 22 control types. (Regarding
the “Condorcet” column, see Footnote 3.)
voting system is then said to be resistant to this control type. If a voting system is susceptible to
some type of control, but the chair’s task can be solved in polynomial time, the system is said to be
vulnerable to this control type.
The quest for a natural voting system with an easy winner-determination procedure that is uni-
versally resistant to control has lasted for more than 15 years now. Among the voting systems that
have been studied with respect to control are plurality, Condorcet, approval, cumulative, Llull, and
(variants of) Copeland voting [12, 13, 20, 21, 14, 3, 22, 2]. Among these systems, plurality and
Copeland voting (denoted Copeland0.5 in [2, 3]) display the broadest resistance to control, yet even
they are not universally control-resistant. The only system currently known to be fully resistant—to
the 20 types of constructive and destructive control studied in [13, 20]—is a highly artificial sys-
tem constructed via hybridization [20]. (We mention that this system was not designed for direct,
real-world use as a “natural” system but rather was intended to rule out the existence of a certain
impossibility theorem [20].)
While approval voting nicely distinguishes between each voter’s acceptable and inacceptable
candidates, it ignores the preference rankings the voters may have about their approved (or disap-
proved) candidates. This shortcoming motivated Brams and Sanver [1] to introduce a voting system
that combines approval and preference-based voting, and they defined the related notions of sincere
and admissible approval strategies, which are quite natural requirements. We adapt their sincere-
strategy preference-based approval voting system in a natural way such that, for elections with at
least two candidates, admissibility of approval strategies (see Definition 2.1) can be ensured even in
the presence of control actions such as deleting candidates and partitioning candidates or voters.2
The purpose of this paper is to study if, and to what extent, this system inherits the control resis-
tances of plurality (which is perhaps the simplest preference-based system) and approval voting.
Denoting this system by SP-AV, we show that SP-AV does combine all the resistances of plurality
and approval voting.
More specifically, we prove that sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting is resistant to
19 and vulnerable to only three of the 22 types of control considered here. For comparison, Table 1
shows the number of resistances, immunities, and vulnerabilities to our 22 control types that are
2Note that in control by partition of voters (see Section 2.2) the run-off may have a reduced number of candidates.
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known for each of Condorcet,3 approval, Llull, plurality,4 and Copeland voting (see [12, 13, 2, 14,
3]), and for SP-AV (see Theorem 3.1 and Table 2 in Section 3).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define and discuss sincere-strategy
preference-based approval voting, the types of control studied in this paper, and the notions of
immunity, susceptibility, vulnerability, and resistance. In Section 3, we prove our results on SP-AV.
Finally, in Section 4 we give our conclusions and state some open problems.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Preference-Based Approval Voting
An election E = (C,V ) is specified by a finite set C of candidates and a finite collection V of voters
who express their preferences over the candidates in C, where distinct voters may, of course, have
the same preferences. How the voter preferences are represented depends on the voting system
used. In approval voting (AV, for short), every voter draws a line between his or her acceptable and
inacceptable candidates (by specifying a 0-1 approval vector, where 0 represents disapproval and 1
represents approval), yet does not rank them. In contrast, many other important voting systems (e.g.,
Condorcet voting, Copeland voting, all scoring protocols, including plurality, Borda count, veto,
etc.) are based on voter preferences that are specified as tie-free linear orderings of the candidates.
As is most common in the literature, votes will here be represented nonsuccinctly: one ballot per
voter. Note that some papers (e.g., [23, 2, 14, 3]) also consider succinct input representations for
elections where multiplicities of votes are given in binary.
Brams and Sanver [1] introduced a voting system that combines approval and preference-based
voting. To distinguish this system from other systems that these authors introduced with the same
purpose of combining approval and preference-based voting [24], we call the variant considered
here (including the assumption of sincerity as explained below and including Rule 1 below, which
will coerce admissibility) sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV, for short).
Definition 2.1 (Brams and Sanver [1]). Let (C,V ) be an election, where the voters both indicate
approvals/disapprovals of the candidates and provide a tie-free linear ordering of all candidates.
For each voter v ∈V , an AV strategy of v is a subset Sv ⊆C such that v approves of all candidates
in Sv and disapproves of all candidates in C− Sv. The list of AV strategies for all voters in V is
3 Note that Table 1 lists only 14 instead of 22 types of control for Condorcet. The reason is that, as in [13], we consider
two types of control by partition of candidates (namely, with and without run-off) and one type of control by partition of
voters, and for each partition case we use the rules TE (“ties eliminate”) and TP (“ties promote”) for handling ties that
may occur in the corresponding subelections (see Section 2.2). However, since Condorcet winners are always unique
when they exist, the distinction between TE and TP is not made for the partition cases within Condorcet voting. Note
further that the two additional control types in Section 2.2.1 (namely, constructive and destructive control by adding a
limited number of candidates [2, 14]) have not been considered for Condorcet voting [12, 13].
4Regarding the references given in Table 1 for plurality, Faliszewski et al. [2, 14] note that plurality is resistant
to constructive and destructive control by adding a limited number of candidates (see Section 2.2 for the definition of
this problem). Hemaspaandra et al. [13] obtained all other results for destructive control within plurality, and for the
constructive partitioning control cases in models TE and TP. The remaining results for plurality are due to Bartholdi et
al. [12].
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called an AV strategy profile for (C,V ). (We sometimes also speak of V ’s AV strategy profile for
C.) For each c∈C, let score(C,V )(c) = ‖{v ∈V |c ∈ Sv}‖ denote the number of c’s approvals. Every
candidate c with the largest score(C,V )(c) is a winner of election (C,V ).
An AV strategy Sv of a voter v ∈ V is said to be admissible if Sv contains v’s most-preferred
candidate and does not contain v’s least-preferred candidate.5 Sv is said to be sincere if for each
c ∈ C, if v approves of c then v also approves of each candidate ranked higher than c (i.e., there
are no gaps allowed in sincere approval strategies). An AV strategy profile for (C,V ) is admissible
(respectively, sincere) if the AV strategies of all voters in V are admissible (respectively, sincere).
Admissibility and sincerity are quite natural requirements. In particular, requiring the voters to
be sincere ensures that their preference rankings and their approvals/disapprovals are not contra-
dictory. Note that sincere strategies for at least two candidates are always admissible if voters are
neither allowed to approve of everybody nor to disapprove of everybody (i.e., if we require voters v
to have only AV strategies Sv with /0 6= Sv 6=C), an assumption adopted by Brams and Sanver [1].6
Henceforth, we will assume that only sincere AV strategy profiles are considered, which—assuming
that the trivial cases Sv = /0 and Sv =C are excluded—necessarily are admissible whenever there are
at least two candidates.7 A vote with an insincere strategy will be considered void.
The following notation was used by Brams and Sanver for a different election system [24],
but is useful for SP-AV as well: Preferences are represented by a left-to-right ranking (separated
by a space) of the candidates (e.g., a b c), with the leftmost candidate being the most-preferred
one, and approval strategies are denoted by inserting a straight line into such a ranking, where all
candidates left of this line are approved of and all candidates right of this line are disapproved of
(e.g., “a | b c” means that a is approved of, while both b and c are disapproved of by this voter). In
our constructions, we sometimes also insert a subset B ⊆C into such approval rankings, where we
assume some arbitrary, fixed order of the candidates in B (e.g., “a | B c” means that a is approved
of, while all b ∈ B and c are disapproved of by this voter).
2.2 Control Problems for Preference-Based Approval Voting
The control problems considered here were introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [12] for con-
structive control and by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [13] for destructive control. In
constructive control scenarios the chair’s goal is to make a favorite candidate win, and in destructive
control scenarios the chair’s goal is to ensure that a despised candidate does not win. As is common,
the chair is assumed to have complete knowledge of the voters’ preference rankings and approval
strategies,8 and as in most papers on electoral control we define the control problems in the unique-
5Brams and Sanver [1] define an AV strategy to be admissible if it is not dominated in a game-theoretic sense [15],
and note that “admissible strategies under AV involve always voting for a most-preferred candidate and never voting for a
least-preferred candidate.” Since we do not focus on the game-theoretic aspects of AV strategies, we define admissibility
as in Definition 2.1.
6 Brams and Sanver actually preclude only the case Sv =C for sincere voters v by stating that “sincere strategies are
always admissible if we exclude ‘vote for everybody’ ” [1]. However, an AV strategy that disapproves of all candidates
obviously is sincere, yet not admissible according to Definition 2.1, which is why we also exclude the case of Sv = /0.
7Note that an AV strategy is never admissible for less than two candidates.
8A detailed discussion of this assumption can be found in [13]. In a nutshell, one justification of this assumption
is that it is realistic in many (though certainly not in all) situations, particularly in those involving small-scale private
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winner model.9 In this model, the chair seeks to, via the control action, either make a designated
candidate the unique winner (in the constructive case) or to prevent a designated candidate from
being a unique winner (in the destructive case).
To achieve his or her goal, the chair modifies the structure of a given election via
adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. Such control actions—specifically those
with respect to control via deleting or partitioning candidates or via partitioning voters—may have
an undesirable impact on the resulting election in that they might turn admissible AV strategies into
inadmissible ones. That is why we define the following rule that coerces admissibility (even under
such control actions):
Rule 1 (AV Strategy Rewrite Rule). If in an election (C,V ) with ‖C‖ ≥ 2 we have Sv = /0 or Sv =C
for some voter v ∈ V , then each such voter’s AV strategy is adjusted to approve of his or her top
candidate and to disapprove of his or her bottom candidate.
This rule coerces /0 6= Sv 6= C for each v ∈ V whenever there are at least two candidates. That
is, though it is legal for a voter to cast an inadmissible vote, the SP-AV system will rewrite this
vote to make it admissible. In Section 2.3 below, we will briefly discuss the SP-AV system and, in
particular, some subtle points regarding Rule 1.
We now formally define our control problems, where each problem is defined by stating the
problem instance together with two questions, one for the constructive and one for the destructive
case. These control problems are tailored to sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting by
requiring every election occurring in these control problems (be it before, during, or after a control
action—so, in particular, this also applies to the subelections in the partitioning cases) to have a
sincere AV strategy profile. Note that when the number of candidates is reduced (due to deleting
candidates or partitioning candidates or voters), approval lines may have to be moved in accordance
with Rule 1.
To avoid unnecessary repetition, when defining the 22 control scenarios and problems consid-
ered in this paper, we will omit (or only very briefly sketch) the motivation of these control scenarios.
Note, however, that each scenario considered has a natural real-world interpretation—ranging from
“get-out-the-vote” drives (control by adding voters) over vote suppression or disenfranchisement
(control by deleting voters) to gerrymandering (control by partitioning voters) for voter control,
and similarly natural real-world interpretations have been discussed in detail for the single cases of
candidate control. These real-world interpretations and motivating examples have been described
at length in a number of previous papers on control, such as [12, 13, 2, 20]. (Note that the journal
version of [20] appears in the same special issue as the present paper.)
elections and in those involving large-scale elections among software agents that cooperate in a multiagent environment
and have an incentive to reveal their preferences over the given alternatives. Another justification is that this paper focuses
on proving control resistances of (i.e., NP-hardness results for) SP-AV, and an NP-hardness result in the more restrictive
setting of complete knowledge clearly implies the corresponding NP-hardness result in the more flexible setting of partial
knowledge (see [13] for more discussion of this point).
9Exceptions are, e.g., [21, 2, 3, 14], where [2, 3, 14] consider both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner
model.
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2.2.1 Control by Adding Candidates
In this control scenario, the chair seeks to reach his or her goal by adding to the election, which
originally involves only “qualified” candidates, some new candidates who are chosen from a given
pool of spoiler candidates. In their study of control for plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting,
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [13] considered only the case of adding an unlimited
number of spoiler candidates (which is the original variant of this problem as defined by Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [12]). We consider the same variant of this problem here to make our results
comparable with those established in [13], but for completeness we in addition consider the case of
adding a limited number of spoiler candidates, where the prespecified limit is part of the problem
instance. This variant of this problem was introduced by Faliszewski et al. [2, 14, 3] in analogy
with the definitions of control by deleting candidates and of control by adding or deleting voters.
They showed that, for the election system Copelandα they investigate, the complexity of these two
problems can drastically change depending on the parameter α , see [2, 3].
We first define the unlimited variant of control by adding candidates.
Name Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates.
Instance An election (C ∪D,V ) and a designated candidate c ∈ C, where the set C of qualified
candidates and the set D of spoiler candidates are disjoint.
Question (constructive) Is it possible to choose a subset D′ ⊆ D such that c is the unique winner
of election (C∪D′,V )?
Question (destructive) Is it possible to choose a subset D′ ⊆ D such that c is not a unique winner
of election (C∪D′,V )?
The problem Control by Adding a Limited Number of Candidates is defined analogously, with
the only difference being that the chair seeks to reach his or her goal by adding at most ℓ spoiler
candidates, where ℓ is part of the problem instance.
2.2.2 Control by Deleting Candidates
In this control scenario, the chair seeks to reach his or her goal by deleting (up to a given number
of) candidates. Here it may happen that inadmissible AV strategies are created by the control action,
but Rule 1 will coerce admissibility again (by moving the line between some voter’s acceptable and
inacceptable candidates to behind the top candidate or to before the bottom candidate whenever
necessary).
Name Control by Deleting Candidates.
Instance An election (C,V ), a designated candidate c ∈C, and a nonnegative integer ℓ.
Question (constructive) Is it possible to delete up to ℓ candidates from C such that c is the unique
winner of the resulting election?
Question (destructive) Is it possible to delete up to ℓ candidates (other than c) from C such that c
is not a unique winner of the resulting election?
7
2.2.3 Control by Partition and Run-Off Partition of Candidates
There are two partition-of-candidates control scenarios. In both scenarios, the chair seeks to reach
his or her goal by partitioning the candidate set C into two subsets, C1 and C2, after which the
election is conducted in two stages. In control by partition of candidates, the election’s first stage
is held within only one group, say C1, and this group’s winners that survive the tie-handling rule
used (see the next paragraph) run against all members of C2 in the second and final stage. In control
by run-off partition of candidates, the election’s first stage is held separately within both groups, C1
and C2, and the winners of both subelections that survive the tie-handling rule used run against each
other in the second and final stage.
We use the two tie-handling rules proposed by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [13]:
ties-promote (TP) and ties-eliminate (TE). In the TP model, all the first-stage winners of a subelec-
tion, (C1,V ) or (C2,V ), are promoted to the final round. In the TE model, a first-stage winner of a
subelection, (C1,V ) or (C2,V ), is promoted to the final round exactly if he or she is that subelection’s
unique winner.
Note that partitioning the candidate set C into C1 and C2 is, in some sense, similar to deleting
C2 from C to obtain subelection (C1,V ) and to deleting C1 from C to obtain subelection (C2,V ).
Also, the final stage of the election may have a reduced number of candidates (which depends on
the tie-handling rule used). So, in the partitioning cases, it may again happen that inadmissible AV
strategies are created by the control action, but Rule 1 will coerce admissibility again.
Name Control by Partition of Candidates.
Instance An election (C,V ) and a designated candidate c ∈C.
Question (constructive) Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique winner
of the final stage of the two-stage election in which the winners of subelection (C1,V ) that
survive the tie-handling rule run against all candidates in C2 (with respect to the votes in V )?
Question (destructive) Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is not a unique winner
of the final stage of the two-stage election in which the winners of subelection (C1,V ) that
survive the tie-handling rule run against all candidates in C2 (with respect to the votes in V )?
Name Control by Run-Off Partition of Candidates.
Instance An election (C,V ) and a designated candidate c ∈C.
Question (constructive) Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique win-
ner of the final stage of the two-stage election in which the winners of subelection (C1,V )
that survive the tie-handling rule run (with respect to the votes in V ) against the winners of
subelection (C2,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule?
Question (destructive) Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is not a unique
winner of the final stage of the two-stage election in which the winners of subelection (C1,V )
that survive the tie-handling rule run (with respect to the votes in V ) against the winners of
subelection (C2,V ) that survive the tie-handling rule?
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2.2.4 Control by Adding Voters
In this control scenario, the chair seeks to reach his or her goal by introducing new voters into a
given election. These additional voters are chosen from a given pool of voters whose preferences
and approval strategies over the candidates from the original election are known. Again, the number
of voters that can be added is prespecified.
Name Control by Adding Voters.
Instance An election (C,V ), a collection W of additional voters with known preferences and ap-
proval strategies over C, a designated candidate c ∈C, and a nonnegative integer ℓ.
Question (constructive) Is it possible to choose a subset W ′ ⊆W with ‖W ′‖ ≤ ℓ such that c is the
unique winner of election (C,V ∪W ′)?
Question (destructive) Is it possible to choose a subset W ′ ⊆W with ‖W ′‖ ≤ ℓ such that c is not a
unique winner of election (C,V ∪W ′)?
2.2.5 Control by Deleting Voters
The chair here seeks to reach his or her goal by suppressing (up to a prespecified number of) voters.
Name Control by Deleting Voters.
Instance An election (C,V ), a designated candidate c ∈C, and a nonnegative integer ℓ.
Question (constructive) Is it possible to delete up to ℓ voters from V such that c is the unique
winner of the resulting election?
Question (destructive) Is it possible to delete up to ℓ voters from V such that c is not a unique
winner of the resulting election?
2.2.6 Control by Partition of Voters
In this scenario, the election again is conducted in two stages, and the chair now seeks to reach his
or her goal by partitioning the voters V into two subcommittees, V1 and V2. In the first stage, the
subelections (C,V1) and (C,V2) are held separately in parallel, and the winners of each subelection
who survive the tie-handling rule move forward to the second and final stage in which they compete
against each other.
As in the candidate-deletion and the candidate-partition cases, also in control by partition of
voters it may happen that inadmissible AV strategies are created by the control action, since the
final stage of the election may have a reduced number of candidates. However, if that happens then
Rule 1 will again coerce admissibility.
Name Control by Partition of Voters.
Instance An election (C,V ) and a designated candidate c ∈C.
Question (constructive) Is it possible to partition V into V1 and V2 such that c is the unique win-
ner of the final stage of the two-stage election in which the winners of subelection (C,V1)
that survive the tie-handling rule run (with respect to the votes in V ) against the winners of
subelection (C,V2) that survive the tie-handling rule?
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Question (destructive) Is it possible to partition V into V1 and V2 such that c is not a unique win-
ner of the final stage of the two-stage election in which the winners of subelection (C,V1)
that survive the tie-handling rule run (with respect to the votes in V ) against the winners of
subelection (C,V2) that survive the tie-handling rule?
2.3 A Brief Discussion of SP-AV
The notion of SP-AV, as defined here, slightly differs from the definition proposed in this paper’s
precursors [4, 25]. For example, [4] specifically required for single-candidate elections that each
voter must approve of this candidate. In the present paper, we drop this requirement, as it in fact
is not needed (because the one candidate in a single-candidate election will always win—even with
zero approvals, i.e., SP-AV is a “voiced” voting system).
The other definitional change is more subtle. In [4, 25], we adopted Brams and Sanver’s as-
sumption that voters v are required to have admissible AV strategies (i.e., only AV strategies Sv with
/0 6= Sv 6= C were allowed).10 By this assumption, any vote with an inadmissible AV strategy was
considered void, and we applied our rule of rewriting inadmissible AV strategies to coerce admissi-
bility only when a control action had turned an originally admissible vote into an inadmissible one.
One problem with this approach was that this rule depended on (and could be viewed as redefining)
control rather than being an integral part of the voting system itself. In contrast, we now allow vot-
ers to cast inadmissible votes, and Rule 1 will turn them into admissible votes the same way it will
coerce admissibility for votes that became inadmissible in the course of a control action. The in-
preparation bookchapter [26] elaborates on this point and on other points regarding the definitional
changes SP-AV has undergone in the course of its development up to its final form in the present
paper. We stress that none of the two changes mentioned above has a severe impact on our findings
or their proofs.
Another issue to be addressed is that the choice of Rule 1 might seem to be purely a matter of
taste, at first glance. For example, given an inadmissible AV strategy of the form | a b c d (re-
spectively, a b c d |), why don’t we change it into an admissible vote of the form, say, a b | c d
rather than, according to Rule 1, into a | b c d (respectively, a b c | d)? The reason is that, once
we have agreed that it is desirable to coerce admissibility, our choice of Rule 1 is the most sensible
way, as this is the minimally invasive rule to coerce admissibility among all possible such rules: We
do change the voters’ approval strategies, but we wish to do this in the least harmful way.
2.4 Immunity, Susceptibility, Vulnerability, and Resistance
The following notions—which are due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [12] (see also [13, 20, 2, 3,
14])—will be central to our complexity analysis of the control problems for SP-AV.
Definition 2.2. Let E be an election system and let Φ be some given type of control.
1. E is said to be immune to Φ-control if
10Except that [1] excludes only the case Sv 6=C, see Footnote 6.
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(a) Φ is a constructive control type and it is never possible for the chair to turn a designated
candidate from being not a unique winner into being the unique winner via exerting Φ-
control, or
(b) Φ is a destructive control type and it is never possible for the chair to turn a designated
candidate from being the unique winner into being not a unique winner via exerting
Φ-control.
2. E is said to be susceptible to Φ-control if it is not immune to Φ-control.
3. E is said to be vulnerable to Φ-control if E is susceptible to Φ-control and the control problem
associated with Φ is solvable in polynomial time.
4. E is said to be resistant to Φ-control if E is susceptible to Φ-control and the control problem
associated with Φ is NP-hard.
For example, approval voting is known to be immune to eight of the twelve types of candidate
control considered in [13]. The proofs of these results crucially employ the equivalences and im-
plications between immunity/susceptibility for various control types shown in [13] and the fact that
approval voting satisfies the unique version of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (denoted
by Unique-WARP, see [13, 12]): If a candidate c is the unique winner in a set C of candidates,
then c is the unique winner in every subset of C that includes c. In contrast with approval voting,
sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP, and we will see
later in Section 3.1 that it indeed is susceptible to each type of control considered here.
Proposition 2.3. Sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP.
Proof. Consider the election (C,V ) with candidate set C = {a,b,c,d} and voter collection V =
{v1,v2,v3,v4}. Removing candidate d changes the profile as follows according to Rule 1:
v1 : b c a | d b c | a
v2 : c | a d b is changed to c | a b
v3 : a b c | d (by removing d): a b | c
v4 : b a c | d b a | c
Note that the approval/disapproval line has been moved in voters v1, v3, and v4 according to
Rule 1. Although c was the unique winner of (C,V ), c is not a winner of ({a,b,c},V ) (in fact, b is
the unique winner of ({a,b,c},V )). Thus, SP-AV does not satisfy Unique-WARP. ❑
3 Results for Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting
Theorem 3.1 below (see also Table 2) shows the complexity results regarding control of elections
for SP-AV. As mentioned in the introduction, with 19 resistances and only three vulnerabilities, this
system has more resistances and fewer vulnerabilities to control (for our 22 control types) than is
currently known for any other natural voting system with a polynomial-time winner problem.
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Plurality SP-AV AV
Control by Constr. Destr. Constr. Destr. Constr. Destr.
Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates R R R R I V
Adding a Limited Number of Candidates R R R R I V
Deleting Candidates R R R R V I
Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: V TE: I
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: V TE: I
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Adding Voters V V R V R V
Deleting Voters V V R V R V
Partition of Voters TE: V TE: V TE: R TE: V TE: R TE: V
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: V
Table 2: Overview of results. Key: I means immune, R means resistant, V means vulnerable, TE
means ties-eliminate, and TP means ties-promote. Results for SP-AV are new; their proofs are either
new or draw on proofs from [13]. Results for plurality and AV, stated here to allow comparison,
are due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [12] and to Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [13].
(The results for control by adding a limited number of candidates for plurality and approval voting,
though not stated explicitly in [12, 13], follow immediately from the proofs of the corresponding
results for the “unlimited” variant of the problem, see Footnote 4.)
Theorem 3.1. Sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting has the resistances and vulnera-
bilities to the 22 types of control defined in Section 2.2 that are shown in Table 2.
3.1 Susceptibility
By definition, all resistance and vulnerability results in particular require susceptibility. In the fol-
lowing two lemmas, we prove that sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting is susceptible
to the 22 types of control defined in Section 2.2. To this end, we will make use of Theorems 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3 of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [13] that provide susceptibility equiv-
alences and implications for various control types.11 For the sake of self-containment, we give
these results below, stated essentially word-for-word as in [13]. In particular, Theorem 3.2 (which
is [13, Thm. 4.1]) gives four equivalences between susceptibility to constructive/destructive control
by adding/deleting candidates/voters; Theorem 3.3 (which is [13, Thm. 4.2]) gives four implica-
tions that link susceptibility to control by (run-off) partition of candidates/voters with susceptibility
to control by deleting candidates/voters; and Theorem 3.4 (which is [13, Thm. 4.3]) states that
every “voiced” voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates and to
destructive control by adding candidates, and that for each voiced voting system susceptibility to
destructive control by partition of voters (in model TE or TP) implies susceptibility to destructive
control by deleting voters. A voting system is said to be voiced if in every one-candidate election,
this candidate wins.
11Although [13] does not consider the case of control by adding a limited number of candidates explicitly, it is imme-
diate that all proofs for the “unlimited” case in [13] work also for this “limited” case.
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Theorem 3.2 (Thm. 4.1 of [13]). 1. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by
adding (either a limited or an unlimited number of) candidates if and only if it is susceptible
to destructive control by deleting candidates.
2. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates if and only if it
is susceptible to destructive control by adding (either a limited or an unlimited number of)
candidates.
3. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding voters if and only if it is
susceptible to destructive control by deleting voters.
4. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters if and only if it is
susceptible to destructive control by adding voters.
Theorem 3.3 (Thm. 4.2 of [13]). 1. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by
partition of voters (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to constructive control by delet-
ing candidates.
2. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by partition or run-off partition of
candidates (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting
candidates.
3. If a voting system is susceptible to constructive control by partition of voters in model TE,
then it is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters.
4. If a voting system is susceptible to destructive control by partition or run-off partition of
candidates (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting can-
didates.
Theorem 3.4 (Thm. 4.3 of [13]). 1. If a voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive con-
trol by partition of voters (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to destructive control by
deleting voters.
2. Each voiced voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates.
3. Each voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive control by adding (either a limited or
an unlimited number of) candidates.
We start with susceptibility to candidate control for SP-AV.
Lemma 3.5. SP-AV is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding candidates (in
both the “limited” and the “unlimited” variant of the problem), by deleting candidates, and by
partition of candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both tie-handling models, TE and
TP).
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Proof. From Theorem 3.4 and the obvious fact that SP-AV is a voiced voting system, it im-
mediately follows that SP-AV is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates and to
destructive control by adding candidates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” variant of the
problem).
Consider the election (C,V ) with candidate set C = {a,b,c,d,e, f} and voter collection V =
{v1,v2, . . . ,v6} and the following partition of C into C1 = {a,c,d} and C2 = {b,e, f}:
(C,V ) is partitioned into (C1,V ) and (C2,V )
v1 : a b c | d e f a c | d b | e f
v2 : b c | a d e f c | a d b | e f
v3 : a c | b d e f a c | d b | e f
v4 : b a c | d e f a c | d b | e f
v5 : a b d e c | f a d | c b e | f
v6 : a e d f c | b a d | c e f | b
With six approvals, c is the unique winner of (C,V ). However, a is the unique winner of (C1,V ),
which implies that c is not promoted to the final stage, regardless of whether we use the TE or TP tie-
handling rule and regardless of whether we employ a partition of candidates with or without run-off.
Thus, SP-AV is susceptible to destructive control by partition of candidates (with or without run-off
and for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP). By Theorem 3.3, SP-AV is also susceptible
to destructive control by deleting candidates. By Theorem 3.2 in turn, SP-AV is also susceptible to
constructive control by adding candidates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” variant of the
problem).
Note that a is not the unique winner of (C,V ), as a loses to c by 5 to 6. However, if we partition
C into C1 = {a,c,d} and C2 = {b,e, f}, then a is the unique winner of (C1,V ) and b is the unique
winner of (C2,V ). Since both subelections have a unique winner, it does not matter whether the TE
rule or the TP rule is applied. The final-stage election is ({a,b},V ) in the case of run-off partition
of candidates, and it is ({a,b,e, f},V ) in the case of partition of candidates. Since a wins against b
in the former case by 4 to 2 and in the latter case by 5 to 4 (and e and f do even worse than b in this
case), a is the unique winner in both cases. Thus, SP-AV is susceptible to constructive control by
partition of candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both models, TE and TP). ❑
We now turn to susceptibility to voter control.
Lemma 3.6. SP-AV is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding voters, by delet-
ing voters, and by partition of voters in both tie-handling models, TE and TP.
Proof. Consider the election (C,V ) with candidate set C = {a,b,c,d,e, f} and voter collection
V = {v1,v2, . . . ,v8} and partition V into V1 = {v1,v2,v3,v4} and V2 = {v5,v6,v7,v8}. Thus, we
14
change:
(C,V ) into (C,V1) and (C,V2)
v1 : a b c | d e f a b c | d e f
v2 : a c | b d e f a c | b d e f
v3 : c b a d | e f c b a d | e f
v4 : a b | d e c f a b | d e c f
v5 : a d c | b e f a d c | b e f
v6 : e b c d | a f e b c d | a f
v7 : d e c f | b a d e c f | b a
v8 : d f | b a c e d f | b a c e
With six approvals, c is the unique winner of (C,V ). However, a is the unique winner of (C,V1) and
d is the unique winner of (C,V2), which implies that c is not promoted to the final stage, regardless
of whether we use the TE or TP tie-handling rule. (In the final-stage election ({a,d},V ), a wins by
5 to 3.) Thus, SP-AV is susceptible to destructive control by partition of voters in models TE and
TP. By Theorem 3.4 and since SP-AV is a voiced system, SP-AV is also susceptible to destructive
control by deleting voters. Finally, by Theorem 3.2, SP-AV is also susceptible to constructive control
by adding voters.
Now, if we let a and c change their roles in the above election and argument, we see that SP-AV
is also susceptible to constructive control by partition of voters in models TE and TP. By Theo-
rem 3.3, susceptibility to constructive control by partition of voters in model TE implies suscepti-
bility to constructive control by deleting voters. Again, by Theorem 3.2, SP-AV is also susceptible
to destructive control by adding voters. ❑
3.2 Candidate Control
Theorems 3.7 and 3.10 below show that sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting is fully
resistant to candidate control. This result should be contrasted with that of Hemaspaandra, Hema-
spaandra, and Rothe [13], who proved immunity and vulnerability for all cases of candidate control
within approval voting (see Table 2). In fact, SP-AV has the same resistances to candidate control
as plurality, and we will show that the construction presented in [13] to prove plurality resistant also
works for sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting in all cases of candidate control ex-
cept one—namely, except for constructive control by deleting candidates. Theorem 3.10 establishes
resistance for this one missing case.
All resistance results in this section follow via a reduction from the NP-complete problem Hit-
ting Set (see, e.g., Garey and Johnson [27]):
Name Hitting Set.
Instance A set B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm}, a nonempty collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets Si ⊆
B,12 and a positive integer k ≤ m.
12Our assumption that S be nonempty (i.e., that n≥ 1) is not explicitly specified in Garey and Johnson [27]. However,
it is clear that requiring n ≥ 1 does not change the complexity of the problem.
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Question Does S have a hitting set of size at most k, i.e., is there a set B′ ⊆ B with ‖B′‖ ≤ k such
that for each i, Si∩B′ 6= /0?
Note that some of our proofs for SP-AV are based on constructions presented in [13] to prove the
corresponding results for approval voting or plurality, whereas some other of our results require new
insights to make the proof work for SP-AV. For completeness, we will present each construction
here (even if the modification of a previous construction is rather straightforward), explicitly stating
whether it is based on a previous construction from [13], and if so, we will state in each case on
which construction it is based and what the differences to the related previous construction are.
Theorem 3.7. SP-AV is resistant to all types of constructive and destructive candidate control de-
fined in Section 2.2 except for constructive control by deleting candidates (which will be handled
separately in Theorem 3.10).
Resistance of SP-AV to constructive control by deleting candidates, which is the missing case
in Theorem 3.7, will be shown as Theorem 3.10 below.
The proof of Theorem 3.7 is based on a construction for plurality in [13], except that only
the arguments for destructive candidate control are given there (simply because plurality was shown
resistant to all cases of constructive candidate control already by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [12] via
different constructions). We now provide a short proof sketch of Theorem 3.7 and the construction
from [13] (slightly modified so as to formally conform with the SP-AV voter representation) in order
to (i) show that the same construction can be used to establish all but one resistances of SP-AV to
constructive candidate control, and (ii) explain why constructive control by deleting candidates
(which is missing in Theorem 3.7) does not follow from this construction.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3.7. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.5 in each case. The resistance
proofs are based on a reduction from Hitting Set and employ Construction 3.8 below, slightly mod-
ified so as to formally conform with the SP-AV voter representation.
Construction 3.8 (Hemaspaandra et al. [13]). Let (B,S ,k) be a given instance of Hitting Set,
where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is a set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a nonempty collection of subsets Si ⊆ B,
and k ≤m is a positive integer. Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{c,w} is the candidate set
and where V consists of the following voters:
1. There are 2(m− k)+2n(k+1)+4 voters of the form: c | w B.
2. There are 2n(k+1)+5 voters of the form: w | c B.
3. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are 2(k+1) voters of the form: Si | c w (B−Si).
4. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there are two voters of the form: b j | w c (B−{b j}).
Since
score({c,w},V )(c)− score({c,w},V )(w)
= (2(m− k)+2n(k+1)+4+2n(k+1))− (2n(k+1)+5+2m)
= 2k(n−1)+2n−1
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is positive (because of n ≥ 1), c is the unique winner of election ({c,w},V ). The key observation is
the following proposition, which can be proven as in [13].
Proposition 3.9 (Hemaspaandra et al. [13]). 1. If S has a hitting set B′ of size k, then w is the
unique SP-AV winner of election (B′∪{c,w},V ).
2. Let D ⊆ B∪{w}. If c is not the unique SP-AV winner of election (D∪{c},V ), then there
exists a set B′ ⊆ B such that
(a) D = B′∪{w},
(b) w is the unique SP-AV winner of election (B′∪{c,w},V ), and
(c) B′ is a hitting set of S of size less than or equal to k.
As an example, the resistance of SP-AV to constructive and destructive control by adding candi-
dates (both in the limited and the unlimited version of the problem) now follows immediately from
Proposition 3.9, via mapping the Hitting Set instance (B,S ,k) to the set {c,w} of qualified candi-
dates and the set B of spoiler candidates, to the voter collection V , and by having c be the designated
candidate in the destructive case and by having w be the designated candidate in the constructive
case.
The other cases of Theorem 3.7 can be proven similarly. ❑ Theorem 3.7
Turning now to the missing case mentioned in Theorem 3.7 above: Why does Construction 3.8
not work for constructive control by deleting candidates? Informally put, the reason is that c is
the only serious rival of w in the election (C,V ) of Construction 3.8, so by simply deleting c the
chair could make w the unique SP-AV winner, regardless of whether S has a hitting set of size k.
However, via a different construction, we can prove resistance also in this case.
Theorem 3.10. SP-AV is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.5. To prove resistance, we provide a reduction from
Hitting Set.13 Let (B,S ,k) be a given instance of Hitting Set, where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is a set,
S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a nonempty collection of subsets Si ⊆ B, and k < m is a positive integer.14
Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{w} is the candidate set and V is the collection of
voters. We assume that the candidates in B are in an arbitrary but fixed order, and for each voter
below, this order is also used in each subset of B. For example, if B = {b1,b2,b3,b4} (where the
elements of B are ordered as b1,b2,b3,b4) and some subset Si = {b1,b3} of B occurs in some voter
then this voter prefers b1 to b3, and so does any other voter whose preference list contains Si.
V consists of the following 4n(k+1)+4m−2k+3 voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are 2(k+1) voters of the form: Si | (B−Si) w.
2. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are 2(k+1) voters of the form: (B−Si) w | Si.
13In contrast, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [12] gave a reduction from Exact Cover by Three-Sets (which is defined in
the proof of Theorem 3.11) to prove that plurality is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
14Note that if k = m then B is always a hitting set of size at most k (provided that S contains only nonempty sets—a
requirement that doesn’t affect the NP-completeness of the problem), and we thus may require that k < m.
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3. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there are two voters of the form: b j | w (B−{b j}).
4. There are 2(m− k) voters of the form: B | w.
5. There are three voters of the form: w | B.
Since for each b j ∈ B, the difference
score(C,V )(w)− score(C,V )(b j) = 2n(k+1)+3− (2n(k+1)+2+2(m− k)) = 1−2(m− k)
is negative (due to k < m), w loses to each member of B and so does not win election (C,V ).
We claim that S has a hitting set B′ of size k if and only if w can be made the unique SP-AV
winner by deleting at most m− k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ of size k. Then, for each b j ∈ B′,
score(B′∪{w},V )(w)−score(B′∪{w},V )(b j)= 2n(k+1)+2(m−k)+3−(2n(k+1)+2+2(m−k)) = 1,
since the approval line is moved for 2(m− k) voters of the third group according to Rule 1, thus
transferring their approvals from members of B−B′ to w. It is easy to see that the approval line is not
moved in any of the other voters according to Rule 1; in particular, the approval line is not moved
in any of the voters from the first and second group, since B′∩Si 6= /0 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. So w is
the unique SP-AV winner of election (B′∪{w},V ). Since B′∪{w}=C− (B−B′), it follows from
‖B‖= m and ‖B′‖= k that deleting m− k candidates from C makes w the unique SP-AV winner.
From right to left: Let D ⊆ B be any set such that ‖D‖ ≤ m− k and w is the unique SP-AV
winner of election (C−D,V ). Let B′ = (C−D)−{w}. Note that B′ ⊆ B and that we have the
following scores in (B′∪{w},V ):
score(B′∪{w},V )(w) = 2(n− ℓ)(k+1)+2(m−‖B′‖)+3,
score(B′∪{w},V )(b j) ≤ 2n(k+1)+2ℓ(k+1)+2+2(m− k) for each b j ∈ B′,
where ℓ is the number of sets Si ∈ S that are not hit by B′, i.e., B′∩ Si = /0. Recall that for each i,
1≤ i≤ n, all of the 2(k+1) voters of the form Si | (B−Si) w in the first voter group have ranked
the candidates in the same order. Thus, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, whenever B′∩Si = /0 one and the same
candidate in B′ benefits from moving the approval line according to Rule 1, namely the candidate
occurring first in our fixed ordering of B′. Call this candidate b and note that
score(B′∪{w},V )(b) = 2n(k+1)+2ℓ(k+1)+2+2(m− k).
Since w is the unique SP-AV winner of (B′∪{w},V ), w has more approvals than any candidate in
B′ and in particular more than b. Thus, we have
score(B′∪{w},V )(w)− score(B′∪{w},V )(b)
= 2(n− ℓ)(k+1)+2(m−‖B′‖)+3−2n(k+1)−2ℓ(k+1)−2−2(m− k)
= 1+2(k−‖B′‖)−4ℓ(k+1) > 0.
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Solving this inequality for ℓ, we obtain
0 ≤ ℓ < 1+2(k−‖B
′‖)
4(k+1) <
4+4k
4(k+1) = 1.
Thus ℓ= 0. It follows that 1+2(k−‖B′‖)> 0, which implies ‖B′‖ ≤ k. Thus, B′ is a hitting set of
size at most k. ❑
3.3 Voter Control
Turning now to control by adding and by deleting voters, it is known from [13] that approval voting
is resistant to constructive control and is vulnerable to destructive control (see Table 2).15 Their
proofs can be modified so as to also apply to sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting. We
here provide only proof sketches; more details of the proofs are provided in the technical report
version [25].
Theorem 3.11. SP-AV is resistant to constructive control by adding voters and by deleting voters
and is vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters and by deleting voters.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3.11. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.6 in all cases. To prove resis-
tance to constructive control by adding voters (respectively, by deleting voters), the construction of
[13, Thm. 4.43] (respectively, of [13, Thm. 4.44]) works, modified only by specifying voter prefer-
ences consistently with the voters’ approval strategies (and, in the deleting-voters case, by adding
a dummy candidate who is disapproved of and ranked last by every voter in the construction to
ensure an admissible AV strategy profile). These constructions provide polynomial-time reductions
from the NP-complete problem Exact Cover by Three-Sets (denoted by X3C; see, e.g., Garey and
Johnson [27]), which is defined as follows:
Name Exact Cover by Three-Sets (X3C).
Instance A set B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m > 1,16 and a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets
Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖= 3 for each i.
Question Does S have an exact cover for B, i.e., is there a subcollection S ′ ⊆S such that every
element of B occurs in exactly one set in S ′?
The polynomial-time algorithms showing that approval voting is vulnerable to destructive con-
trol by adding voters and by deleting voters [13, Thm. 4.24] can be straightforwardly adapted to
also work for sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting, since no approval lines are moved
according to Rule 1 in these control scenarios. ❑
15Meir et al. [21] proved in their interesting “multi-winner” model (which generalizes Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s
model [12] by adding a utility function and some other parameters) that approval voting is resistant to constructive control
by adding voters. According to Footnote 13 of [13], this resistance result immediately follows from the corresponding
resistance result in [28, 13], essentially due to the fact that lower bounds in more flexible models are inherited from more
restrictive models.
16Our assumption that m > 1 is not explicitly specified in Garey and Johnson [27]. However, it is clear that requiring
m > 1 does not change the complexity of the problem.
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We now prove that, just like plurality, sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting is re-
sistant to constructive and destructive control by partition of voters in model TP. In fact, the proof
presented in [13] for plurality in these two cases also works for SP-AV with minor modifications.
In contrast, approval voting is vulnerable to the destructive variant of this control type [13].
Theorem 3.12. SP-AV is resistant to constructive and destructive control by partition of voters in
model TP.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3.12. The proof is again based on Construction 3.8, but the reduction
is now from Restricted Hitting Set, which is defined just as Hitting Set (see Section 3.2) except that
n(k+1)+1 ≤ m− k is required in addition. Restricted Hitting Set is also NP-complete [13]. Now,
the key observation is the following proposition, which can be proven as in [13].
Proposition 3.13 (Hemaspaandra et al. [13]). Let (B,S ,k) be a given Restricted Hitting Set in-
stance, where B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is a set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a nonempty collection of subsets
Si ⊆ B, and k ≤ m is a positive integer such that n(k + 1) + 1 ≤ m− k. If (C,V ) is the election
resulting from (B,S ,k) via Construction 3.8, then the following three statements are equivalent:
1. S has a hitting set of size less than or equal to k.
2. V can be partitioned such that w is the unique SP-AV winner in model TP.
3. V can be partitioned such that c is not the unique SP-AV winner in model TP.
The theorem now follows immediately from Proposition 3.13. ❑ Theorem 3.12
Finally, we turn to control by partition of voters in model TE. For this control type, Hema-
spaandra et al. [13] proved approval voting resistant in the constructive case and vulnerable in the
destructive case. We have the same results for sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting.
Our resistance proof in the constructive case (see the proof of Theorem 3.14) is similar to the cor-
responding proof of resistance in [13]. However, while our polynomial-time algorithm showing
vulnerability for SP-AV in the destructive case (see the proof of Theorem 3.15) is based on the
corresponding polynomial-time algorithm for approval voting in [13], it extends their algorithm in
a nontrivial way.
Theorem 3.14. SP-AV is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in model TE.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.6. The proof of resistance is based on the construction
of [13, Thm. 4.46] with only minor changes. Let an X3C instance (B,S ) be given, where B =
{b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m > 1, is a set and S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of subsets Si ⊆ B with
‖Si‖ = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Without loss of generality, we may assume that n ≥ m. Define the
value ℓ j = ‖{Si ∈S |b j ∈ Si}‖ for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3m.
Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{w,x,y}∪Z is the candidate set with the distinguished
candidate w, Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zn}, and where V is defined to consist of the following 4n+m voters:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form: y Si | w ((B−Si)∪{x}∪Z).
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2. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form: y zi | w (B∪{x}∪ (Z−{zi})).
3. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter of the form: w (Z−{zi}) Bi | x y zi (B−Bi),
where Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j}.
4. There are n+m voters of the form: x | y (B∪{w}∪Z).
Note that score(C,V )(b j) = n for each b j ∈ B. Since the above construction is only slightly
modified from the proof of [13, Thm. 4.46], so as to formally conform with the SP-AV voter repre-
sentation, the same argument as in that proof shows that S has an exact cover for B if and only if w
can be made the unique SP-AV winner by partition of voters in model TE. Note that, in the present
control scenario, approval voting and SP-AV can differ only in the run-off, but the construction
ensures that they don’t differ there.
From left to right, if S has an exact cover for B then partition the set of voters as follows: V1
consists of the m voters of the form y Si | w ((B−Si)∪{x}∪Z) that correspond to the sets in the
exact cover, of the n+m voters who approve of only x, and of the n voters who approve of y and zi,
1≤ i≤ n. Let V2 =V −V1. It follows that w is the unique SP-AV winner of both subelection (C,V2)
and the run-off, simply because no candidate proceeds to the run-off from the other subelection,
(C,V1), in which x and y tie for winner with a score of n+m each.
From right to left, suppose w can be made the unique SP-AV winner by partition of voters in
model TE. Let (V1,V2) be a partition of V such that w is the unique SP-AV winner of the run-
off. According to model TE, w must also be the unique SP-AV winner of one subelection, say
of (C,V1). Note that each voter of the form y zi | w (B∪{x}∪ (Z−{zi})) has to be in V2 (oth-
erwise, we would have score(C,V1)(w) = score(C,V1)(zi) for at least one i, and so w would not be
the unique SP-AV winner of (C,V1) anymore). However, if there were more than m voters of
the form y Si | w ((B−Si)∪{x}∪Z) in V2 then score(C,V2)(y) > n+m, and so y would be the
unique SP-AV winner of the other subelection, (C,V2). But then, also in the SP-AV model, y would
win the run-off against w because score({w,y},V )(y) = 3n+m > n = score({w,y},V )(w), which con-
tradicts the assumption that w has been made the unique SP-AV winner by the partition (V1,V2).
Hence, there are at most m voters of the form y Si | w ((B−Si)∪{x}∪Z) in V2, and these m
voters correspond to an exact cover of B, since otherwise there would be at least one b j ∈ B with
score(C,V1)(b j) = n = score(C,V1)(w). ❑
Theorem 3.15. SP-AV is vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters in model TE.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.6. To prove vulnerability, we describe a polynomial-
time algorithm showing that (and how) the chair can exert destructive control by partition of vot-
ers in model TE for sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting. Our algorithm extends the
polynomial-time algorithm designed by Hemaspaandra et al. [13] to prove approval voting vulnera-
ble to this type of control. Specifically, our algorithm adds Loop 2 below to their algorithm, and we
will explain below why it is necessary to add this second loop.
Let (C,V ) be an election, and for each voter v ∈V , let Sv ⊆C denote v’s AV strategy. In each
iteration of Loop 1 in the algorithm below, we will consider three candidates, a, b, and c. Define the
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following five numbers:17
Wc = ‖{v ∈V |a 6∈ Sv, b 6∈ Sv, c ∈ Sv}‖, Lc = ‖{v ∈V |a ∈ Sv, b ∈ Sv, c 6∈ Sv}‖,
Da = ‖{v ∈V |a ∈ Sv, b 6∈ Sv, c 6∈ Sv}‖, Db = ‖{v ∈V |a 6∈ Sv, b ∈ Sv, c 6∈ Sv}‖, and
Dac = ‖{v ∈V |a ∈ Sv, b 6∈ Sv, c ∈ Sv}‖.
In addition, we introduce the following notation. Given an election (C,V ) and two distinct
candidates x,y ∈ C, let diff (x,y) denote the number of voters in V who prefer x to y minus the
number of voters in V who prefer y to x. Define Bc to be the set of candidates y 6= c in C such that
diff (y,c) ≥ 0.
The input to our algorithm is an election (C,V ), where each voter v ∈ V has a sincere AV
strategy Sv (otherwise, the input is considered malformed and outright rejected), and a distinguished
candidate c ∈C. On this input, our algorithm works as follows.
1. Checking the trivial cases: can be done as in the case of approval voting, see the proof of
[13, Thm. 4.21]. In particular, if C = {c} then output “control impossible” and halt, since c
cannot help but win. If C contains more candidates than only c but c already is not the unique
SP-AV winner of (C,V ) then output the (successful) partition (V, /0) and halt. Otherwise, if
‖C‖= 2 then output “control impossible” and halt, as c is the unique SP-AV winner of (C,V )
in the current case and so, however the voters are partitioned, c must win—against the one
rivalling candidate—at least one subelection and also the run-off.
2. Loop 1: For each a,b ∈ C such that ‖{a,b,c}‖ = 3, check whether V can be partitioned
into V1 and V2 such that score(C,V1)(a)≥ score(C,V1)(c) and score(C,V2)(b)≥ score(C,V2)(c). As
shown in the proof of [13, Thm. 4.21], this is equivalent to checking
Wc−Lc ≤ Da +Db.(3.1)
If (3.1) fails, this a and b cannot prevent c from being the unique winner of at least one
subelection and thus also of the run-off, so we move on to test the next a and b in this loop.
If (3.1) holds, however, output the partition (V1,V2) and halt, where V1 consists of the voters
contributing to Da, of the voters contributing to Dac, and of min(Wc,Da) voters contributing
to Wc, and where V2 =V −V1.
3. Loop 2: For each d ∈ Bc, partition V as follows. Let V1 consist of all voters in V who approve
of d, and let V2 = V −V1. If d is the unique winner of (C,V1), then output (V1,V2) as a
successful partition and halt. Otherwise, go to the next d ∈ Bc.
4. Termination: If in no iteration of either Loop 1 or Loop 2 a successful partition of V was
found, then output “control impossible” and halt.
17This notation is adopted from [13] and adjusted here to the SP-AV system. Wc is the number of votes in which c wins
one approval against both a and b, Lc is the number of votes in which c loses one approval against both a and b, and Da,
Db, and Dac are the numbers of votes in which the candidate(s) in the subscript gain one approval against the candidate(s)
not in the subscript (thus decreasing their deficit).
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Let us give a short explanation of why Loop 2 is needed for SP-AV by stressing the difference
with approval voting. As shown in the proof of [13, Thm. 4.21], if none of the trivial cases applied,
then condition (3.1) holds for some a,b ∈C with ‖{a,b,c}‖ = 3 if and only if destructive control by
partition of voters in model TE is possible for approval voting. Thus, for approval voting, if Loop 1
was not successful for any such a and b, we may immediately jump to the termination stage, where
the algorithm outputs “control impossible” and halts. In contrast, if none of the trivial cases applied,
then the existence of candidates a and b with ‖{a,b,c}‖ = 3 who satisfy (3.1) is not equivalent to
destructive control by partition of voters in model TE being possible for SP-AV: It is a sufficient, yet
not a necessary condition. The reason is that even if there are no candidates a and b who can prevent
c from winning one subelection (in some partition of voters) and from proceeding to the run-off, it
might still be possible that c loses or ties the run-off due to moving the approval line according to
Rule 1.
Indeed, if Loop 1 was not successful, c will lose or tie the run-off exactly if there exists a
candidate d 6= c such that diff (d,c)≥ 0 and d can win one subelection (for some partition of voters).
This is precisely what is being checked in Loop 2. Indeed, note that the partition (V1,V2) chosen
in Loop 2 for d ∈ Bc is the best possible partition for d in the following sense: If d is not a unique
SP-AV winner of subelection (C,V1) then, for each W ⊆ V , d is not a unique SP-AV winner of
subelection (C,W ). To see this, simply note that if d is not a unique SP-AV winner of (C,V1), then
there is some candidate x with score(C,V1)(x) = score(C,V1)(d) = ‖V1‖, which by our choice of V1
implies score(C,W )(x)≥ score(C,W )(d) for each subset W ⊆V . ❑
4 Conclusions and Open Questions
We have shown that Brams and Sanver’s sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting sys-
tem [1], when adjusted so as to coerce admissibility (rather than excluding inadmissible votes a
priori), combines the resistances of approval and plurality voting to procedural control: SP-AV is
resistant to 19 of the 22 previously studied types of control. On the one hand, like Copeland voting
[2, 3], SP-AV is fully resistant to constructive control, yet unlike Copeland it additionally is broadly
resistant to destructive control. On the other hand, like plurality [2, 12, 13, 14], SP-AV is fully
resistant to candidate control, yet unlike plurality it additionally is broadly resistant to voter control.
In conclusion, for these 22 types of control, SP-AV has more resistances and fewer vulnerabilities to
control than is currently known for any other natural voting system with a polynomial-time winner
problem (see Table 1). However, when comparing approval voting and SP-AV, it should also be
noted that the former is even immune to nine of these 22 control types, whereas the latter has no
immunities at all. Since immunity may be seen as a perfect protection against control and resistance
provides protection to control only in a computational sense, one should carefully evaluate the pros
and cons of both systems. The result of such an evaluation will certainly depend on which particular
types of control one wishes to be protected against.
As an interesting task for future research, we propose to expand the study of SP-AV with respect
to other computational properties than its behavior regarding procedural control (see, e.g., [9, 26]),
and to investigate also its social choice properties in more detail. In addition, we propose as an
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interesting and extremely ambitious task for future work the study of SP-AV (and other voting
systems as well) beyond the worst-case—as we have done here—and towards an appropriate typical-
case complexity model; see, e.g., [29, 30, 31, 32, 33] for interesting results and discussion in this
direction.
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